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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TWISTED CURRENTS: NAVIGATING THROUGH CORPORATE
VENUE IN MISSOURI AND THE QUEST TO SIMPLIFY ITS
CONSTRUCTION

INTRODUCTION
“I am convinced that there is nothing radically wrong with [Missouri]
venue statutes if they are properly construed.”1 For nearly fifty years, though,
Missouri courts have consistently failed to properly construe the state’s venue
statutes with respect to corporate residence for venue purposes. The case of
State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown2 in 1951 presented the Supreme Court of
Missouri with its first opportunity to decide the novel question as to whether
the court should adhere to prior statutory interpretation regarding corporate
venue, or instead venture forth with a new statutory construction. The court
chose to take the latter course of action in O’Keefe, setting forth a new
statutory construction and thus effectively changing the construction of
corporate residence for venue purposes.
Since then, Missouri courts have continued to wander down the road paved
by the O’Keefe court. The journey down this road, however, has been fraught
with unnecessary complexity and confusion. Judge Wolff made reference to
this complexity when he noted in his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Smith
v. Gray3 that “[n]early all Missouri venue statutes can be readily understood by
reading the language of the statutes themselves. By contrast, [however], venue
provisions relating to corporations require an understanding of the statutory
language, the Missouri business corporations statute, and decisions of [the
Supreme Court of Missouri].”4 In addition to the unnecessary complexity and
confusion that has been perpetuated by the court’s improper construction,
occasionally there have been illogical results in corporate venue oriented
cases.5 Hence, it is time for the complexity, confusion and illogical results that
have plagued Missouri courts since O’Keefe to be lessened by invoking a new

1. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 355 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (Storckman,
J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
2. 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).
3. 979 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (Wolff, J. concurring).
4. Id.
5. See O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 304; State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo.
1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); State ex
rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
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form of statutory interpretation. The current construction of corporate
residence for venue purposes should be replaced with a simplified and more
logical formula; one which would lessen the need for procedural posturing by
plaintiffs by establishing a corporation’s residence for venue purposes as either
the location of its office or agent for the conduct of its usual and customary
business or the location of its agent for the service of process.
Part I of this Comment presents a hypothetical that reveals how the current
statutory construction regarding corporate residence for venue purposes can
lead to illogical results. This section also surveys some aspects of procedural
posturing that have now become commonplace as a result of the court’s current
corporate venue law interpretation. Parts II and III briefly canvass the history
of venue in Missouri and analyze the development of Missouri venue statutes
concerning corporate residence, respectively.
Part IV discusses the
development of law regarding corporate residence and examines recent cases
that perpetuate prior law.
These cases contain certain dissents and
concurrences that allude to the need for the simplification of corporate venue
law interpretation. Part V examines why the present approach fails to
adequately resolve the problem outlined in Part I and proposes that the
Supreme Court of Missouri undertake a new interpretive stance when deciding
corporate venue issues. In conclusion, Part VI establishes that the residence of
a corporation for venue purposes should be either the location of its office or
agent for the conduct of its usual and customary business or the location of its
registered agent for the service of process.
I. THE PROBLEM
A.

Suit is Brought Against a Corporation as the Sole Defendant

Assume that A is an individual plaintiff who wishes to bring suit against Z
for a cause of action that accrued in Pope County.6 A is a resident of Ralls
County. Z is a Missouri corporation that maintains an office for the transaction
of its business in the City of St. Louis7 and has its registered agent located in
St. Louis County. A wants to bring suit against the corporation in the City of
St. Louis due to the preconceived notion that a City of St. Louis jury will be

6. All counties used in this hypothetical problem are in Missouri.
7. According to the Missouri Constitution, the City of St. Louis is recognized as both a city
and as a separate and independent county apart from St. Louis County. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 31.
For an in-depth discussion on the separation of the City of St. Louis from St. Louis County, see
JAMES NEAL PRIMM, LION OF THE VALLEY: ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI FROM 1764 TO 1980 (3d ed.
1998).
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more sympathetic to A.8 The issue that presents itself is whether the City of St.
Louis is the appropriate venue for a suit against corporation Z.
If plaintiff A brings suit solely against the corporation, section 508.040 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes becomes the applicable venue statute because
“[w]here all of the defendants are corporations, . . . the corporate venue statute
applies.”9 Section 508.040 provides in relevant part:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the
cause of action accrued, . . . or in any county where such corporations shall
have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and
customary business.10

Thus, A has a choice of venue in this particular instance. A can bring suit
against corporation Z in Pope County where the cause of action accrued, or in
the City of St. Louis since that is where Z maintains an office for the
transaction of its business.11 Because “[t]he primary purpose of Missouri’s
venue statutes is to provide a convenient, logical and orderly forum for the
resolution of disputes,”12 it seems only logical that one may bring suit against a
corporation in any county where that corporation has an office for the
transaction of its business.
One point of relevance should be mentioned to provide clarification. Just
because a corporation conducts business in a particular county does not mean
that venue is proper in that county.13 The Missouri Court of Appeals held in
Wadlow v. Donald Lindner Homes, Inc.14 that “[t]he venue statute . . . does not
8. Judge Robertson observed that there have been an “unending series of [cases] in which
civil tort plaintiffs and defendants enter protracted procedural plotting to embrace or avoid the
generous juries of the City of St. Louis.” State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 821.
See also http://www.verdictreporter.com. Discrepancies between counties in regard to jury
verdict amounts is not a “problem” confined solely to the state of Missouri. “[T]here are certain
counties in Texas that routinely render verdicts out of proportion with those rendered in similar
cases in other counties in this state, and, presumably, far in excess of the value of the cases tried.”
Gregory B. Westfall, The Nature of This Debate: A Look at the Texas Foreign Corporation
Venue Rule and a Method For Analyzing the Premises and Promises of Tort Reform, 26 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 903, 906 (1995).
9. State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc).
10. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998) (emphasis added).
11. Id.
12. State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
13. See Craig A. Adoor & Joseph J. Simeone, The Law of Venue in Missouri, 32 ST. LOUIS.
U. L.J. 639, 655 (1988).
14. 654 S.W.2d 644 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). In Wadlow, the plaintiff brought suit against a
corporate defendant in St. Charles County based on the fact that: (1) twenty percent of the
corporation’s work was done in St. Charles County; (2) the president of the corporation was a
resident of St. Charles County; (3) a few of the corporate defendant’s business cards listed a St.
Charles County address; (4) some of the corporate defendant’s mail was received in St. Charles
County; and (5) some company records were stored in St. Charles County. The court determined
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consider the amount of business transacted by a domestic corporation in a
specific county. It focuses, instead, on the office of the agent for the
transaction of business.”15
B.

Suit is Brought Against a Corporation and an Individual

Thus far, it is clear that a corporation’s residence for venue purposes when
the corporation is the sole defendant in a suit is in any county where that
particular corporation maintains an office or agent for the transaction of its
usual and customary business. To complicate matters, though, assume further
that plaintiff A wanted to bring suit against both corporation Z and an
additional defendant, B, who is an individual and a resident of St. Louis
County. When an individual is joined with a corporation, “the general venue
statute, rather than [section] 508.040, which deals with suits against
corporations, has been held to be the applicable statute . . . .”16 The general
venue statute, codified at section 508.010, provides in relevant part:
Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought:
(1) When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in the county within
which the defendant resides, or in the county within which the plaintiff
resides, and the defendant may be found;
(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in different counties,
the suit may be brought in any such county;
(3) When there are several defendants, some residents and others
nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state
in which any defendant resides;
(4) When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit may be brought
in any county in this state; . . . .17

In this situation, because there are two defendants and neither of them are
nonresidents of the state, section 508.010(2) applies. Hence, the suit may be
brought in any county where any one of the defendants resides. The crucial
question becomes in which county is the corporation’s residence located. One
might assume that a corporation’s residence for venue purposes would be any
county where it maintains an office or agent for the transaction of its business
pursuant to section 508.040. This assumption would allow A to bring suit

that there did not exist an agent or office for the transaction of the corporate defendant’s business
in St. Charles County. Id. at 647.
15. Wadlow, 654 S.W.2d at 647. See also Judy v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 892
S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
16. State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
17. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.010 (1998) (emphasis added).
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against both the individual and the corporation in the City of St. Louis.
Section 508.040 dictates the locale of corporate residence when the corporation
is the sole defendant, so surely there would not be a different result merely
because an individual was joined with the corporation. According to O’Keefe,
however, the residence of corporation Z for venue purposes is no longer where
it maintains an office for the transaction of its business, but rather it is the
location of its registered agent.18
It should be noted that “the agent for purposes of corporate venue is not the
same as the corporation’s registered agent for purposes of service of
process.”19 The Missouri Court of Appeals held in State ex rel. Pagliara v.
Stussie20 that agent, “as used in [section] 508.040 need not be defined in the
same [narrow] way as it has been defined in service of process cases.”21 In
State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr,22 the Supreme Court of Missouri advanced the
Restatement (Second) of Agency definition of agent to more fully develop the
definition that was set forth in Pagliara.23 The court held that the requisite
elements of an agency relationship are:
(1) that an agent holds a power to alter legal relations between the principal
and a third party; (2) that an agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within
the scope of the agency; [and] (3) that a principal has the right to control the
conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to the agent.24

Furthermore, in a case subsequent to Elson, entitled State ex rel. Bunting v.
Koehr,25 the court made perfectly clear that all three of the requisite agency
elements must be established for there to exist an agency relationship sufficient
to support corporate venue.26
The rules governing registered agents, on the other hand, do not succumb
to the necessity that certain requirements derived from case law be fulfilled, as
is the case with mere agency relationships. Rather, registered agents for the
service of process are provided for in Missouri statutory law.27 As a result, all
corporations in Missouri are required by statute to maintain a registered agent

18. State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).
19. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 654.
20. 549 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
21. Id. at 903.
22. 856 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
23. James A. Endicott, Finding Corporate Venue in Unlikely Places, 55 J. MO. B. 343, 344
(1999).
24. Elson, 856 S.W.2d at 60 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 12, 13 and 14
(1959)).
25. 865 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
26. See Endicott, supra note 23, at 353.
27. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.370-.380 (1998) (regarding domestic corporations); MO.
REV. STAT. § 351.588 (1998) (regarding foreign corporations). Insurance corporations, however,
are not required by statute to have a registered agent for the service of process.
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for the service of process in the state. The registered agent can be either an
individual or a corporate entity, but primarily the basic duty of the registered
agent is to handle the legal affairs of the corporation.28 It is often the case that
a corporation will designate as its registered agent another corporation skilled
in the handling of such legal affairs.29 With an understanding of the difference
between agent and registered agent for the service of process now achieved, let
us delve back into the analysis of our problem.
C. Rationale for the Corporate Residence Discrepancy
The above-mentioned example wherein an individual and a corporation are
sued as defendants is actually analogous to a line of cases that have come
before the Missouri courts.30 The Supreme Court of Missouri has determined
that when an individual is joined with a corporation, the corporation’s
residence for venue purposes pursuant to section 508.010 is the location of its
registered agent. The court has based this determination on their interpretation
of section 351.375, which provides in relevant part:
The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes
to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.31

It is the court’s interpretation of section 351.375 that is really at the center
of the dispute over corporate venue.32 The court’s current interpretation of
section 351.375 fixes the residence of a corporation at the location of its
registered agent pursuant to the applicability of section 508.010. Although this
interpretation does not necessarily defeat a plaintiff’s chances that it might still
bring suit in a county where the corporate defendant maintains an office for the
transaction of its business, it does make it much more difficult. Hence, in our
problem if A wants to bring suit against Z and B in the City of St. Louis, A will
be required to find a way around having the court place reliance on section
351.375. To keep the court from looking to section 351.375, A must render
section 508.010 inapplicable.

28. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 351.370 (1998).
29. The Company Corporation is one such corporation that provides registered agent
services to corporations around the country.
See The Company Corporation, at
http://www.corporate.com/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 20, 2001).
30. See State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1951) (en banc); State ex rel.
Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359
S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d
273 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en
banc); State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc); State
ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
31. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375 (1998) (emphasis added).
32. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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D. Procedural Posturing
In State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert,33 that is exactly what
the plaintiff attempted to do. The plaintiff brought suit against an individual
and two corporations for a cause of action that accrued in St. Louis County.
The individual defendant was a resident of St. Louis County, and the two
corporate defendants were deemed to be residents of St. Louis County pursuant
to the court’s reliance on section 351.375 as the means of determining
corporate residence under section 508.010.34 The suit was filed in the City of
St. Louis, but one of the corporate defendants filed a motion to dismiss for
improper venue. Prior to the judge’s ruling on the motion to dismiss, the
plaintiff dismissed the individual defendant without prejudice. The plaintiff
then asserted that venue was proper in the City of St. Louis pursuant to section
508.040 since the sole defendants were both corporations and one of the
corporations maintained an office for the transaction of its business in the City
of St. Louis. The court held, however, that “venue is determined as the case
stands when brought,35 not when a motion challenging venue is decided.”36
Hence, proper venue was found to still lie in St. Louis County.
The issue that was raised in DePaul Health Center regarding when venue
is to be determined has recently been at the center of a profusion of cases in
Missouri.37 Although the plaintiff did not succeed in its attempt to locate
venue in the county in which he wanted, the plaintiff did open the door to a
variety of other means of circumventing the one-two-punch combination of
sections 351.375 and 508.010 (designating the residence of a corporate
defendant at the location of the corporation’s registered agent when that
corporate defendant is joined with an individual). Hence, the decision
rendered in DePaul Health Center has resulted in a variety of ingenious (albeit
controversial) procedural posturing techniques.
The DePaul Health Center decision leaves the impression that A cannot do
anything subsequent to the filing of the suit to destroy venue. Thus, A cannot

33. 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1994) (en banc).
34. See id. at 821.
35. To more fully understand what the court meant by “when brought,” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY defines “bring suit” as:
To ‘bring’ an action or suit has a settled customary meaning at law, and refers to the
initiation of legal proceedings in a suit. A suit is ‘brought’ at the time it is
commenced . . . . Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and also most state courts,
filing a complaint with the court commences a civil action.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
36. State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)
(emphasis added).
37. See, e.g., State ex rel. Breckenridge v. Sweeney, 920 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1996) (en banc);
State ex rel. Bunker Res., Recycling and Reclamation, Inc. v. Dierker, 955 S.W.2d 931 (Mo.
1997) (en banc).
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dismiss the suit against B for the purpose of shifting the applicable venue
statute from section 508.010 to section 508.040 once A has already brought
suit against Z and B. Yet, as the case of State ex rel. Breckenridge v.
Sweeney38 illustrates, A may have another avenue to pursue in an attempt to
maintain the corporate defendant’s residence in the City of St. Louis for venue
purposes.
In Breckenridge, the procedural posturing concept at issue centered on
“pretensive joinder.” In that case, the defendant argued that the plaintiffs
joined the individual defendant solely as a means of obtaining venue in the
county where one of the corporate defendants’ registered agent was located.
The court in Breckenridge noted that “[v]enue is pretensive if (1) the petition
on its face fails to state a cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2)
the petition does state a cause of action against the resident defendant, but . . .
there is, in fact, no cause of action against the resident defendant . . . .”39 Yet,
it is the party asserting pretensive joinder that bears the burden of proof and the
burden of persuasion.40 This is because the court presumes that any allegations
made by the plaintiff against a defendant are based on an honest belief held by
the plaintiff that a valid cause of action exists against the defendant.41 The
case of Breckenridge does not really apply to our problem, because A does not
want to join an individual to get venue placed in the county of the
corporation’s registered agent. If the tables were reversed, however, and the
registered agent of corporation Z was located in the City of St. Louis while its
business office was located in St. Louis County, A might indeed want to join B
as an additional defendant. And it could do so as long as A showed the joinder
was not pretensive. In our problem, however, A wants venue placed in the
county of the corporation’s business office while still bringing suit against
individual B.
If a plaintiff has chosen to join an individual to achieve venue in a county
where a corporation’s registered agent is located, it seems only natural that a
plaintiff might choose not to join an individual so as to achieve venue in a
county where a corporation’s office for the transaction of its business is
located. An example of this type of procedural posturing can be found in the
case of State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason.42 This method of procedural
posturing is one that A could potentially employ as a means of attaining City of
St. Louis venue. In Armstrong, the plaintiff brought suit solely against the
corporate defendant as a means of achieving venue in the City of St. Louis
pursuant to section 508.040. The plaintiff relied on the language in DePaul

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

920 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1996) (en banc).
Breckenridge, 920 S.W.2d at 902.
See id.
See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 648.
State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000) (en banc).
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Health Center that venue is determined “as the case stands when brought.”43
The plaintiff subsequently amended its petition the next day to include an
additional individual defendant. The defendant corporation alleged that
plaintiff engaged in a venue maneuvering practice akin to “pretensive
nonjoinder,” whereby the plaintiff did not join the individual defendant so as to
avoid destroying City of St. Louis venue.44 The plaintiff, however, in its brief
to the Supreme Court of Missouri advanced the argument that Missouri law
grants plaintiffs—not defendants—the right to choose venue from a number of
permissible choices specified in the venue statutes.
Theoretically, A could do the same thing by filing suit solely against the
corporation Z, rather than against Z and the individual B concurrently. A
would then later add B as an additional defendant once venue had already been
determined to lie in the City of St. Louis pursuant to section 508.040. The
addition of B as an individual defendant in the suit would theoretically not
destroy section 508.040 venue in the City of St. Louis because, according to
DePaul Health Center, venue was proper in the City of St. Louis at the time
the suit was brought against the sole corporate defendant. The plaintiff in
Armstrong relied heavily on this proposition and also on the dissent issued by
Judge White in State ex rel. Bunker Resource, Recycling & Reclamation, Inc.
v. Dierker,45 where he succinctly restated the law outlined in DePaul Health
Center that “if venue properly lies when suit is filed, subsequent events do not
make venue improper.”46
This method of procedural posturing, however, has its critics.47 Yet, it is
evident that with a proper construction of Missouri venue laws, the need for
such procedural posturing in cases in which an individual is joined with a
corporation would no longer be necessary. The problem set forth in the abovementioned example is clear—due to prior court interpretations of corporate
residence in regard to venue, the application of one venue statute instead of the
other changes a corporation’s residence and is thus overly complex and
illogical. The decision rendered in O’Keefe, and in subsequent cases dealing
with the issue of corporate residence when a corporation is joined with an
individual, seems contrary to the primary purpose of the venue statutes—to
provide a “logical . . . forum for the resolution of disputes.”48

43. State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. 1994) (en
banc).
44. See Relator’s Brief at 5-6, State ex rel Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed
Nov. 14, 2000).
45. 955 S.W.2d 931 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
46. Id. at 934 (White, J., dissenting).
47. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers, State ex rel.
Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000).
48. DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 822 (quoting State ex rel. Elson v. Koehr, 856
S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
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In order to garner a more complete understanding of the primary purpose
of the venue statutes, it is necessary to delve into a history of venue in
Missouri. Once the history of venue in Missouri is understood, only then can
one grasp how the statutory language has come to be interpreted in such a
complex and illogical manner, and ultimately how the statutory interpretation
needs to be changed.
II. HISTORY OF VENUE
Venue is a concept whose origin dates to the foundation of the English
judicial system.49 Venue originally referred to the locality from which jurors
were selected.50 Jurors once played an integral role in the questioning of
witnesses.51 The exercise of this function was found to be most effective if the
jurors were drawn from the area where the dispute arose or where the land was
located.52 As the English judicial system began to develop, the active
participatory role that jurors once played lessened and greater focus was placed
on the distinction between transitory and local actions.53
Today, “[t]he typical state statute distinguishes, expressly or effectively,
between ‘transitory’ actions . . . [and] ‘local’ actions . . . .”54 A transitory
action is often associated with personal injury claims because venue can follow
the parties, while a local action involves disputes over fixed subjects, such as
real property.55 As greater focus was placed on the distinction between local
versus transitory actions, the venue practice in England changed. Venue came
to be “a designation of the location or geographical situs where the court has
jurisdiction to act in a particular lawsuit.”56
It is important to note that venue should be distinguished from jurisdiction,
which stands for the power of the court to decide the case. According to
Richardson v. Richardson,57 however, “[t]here is no longer any requirement
that the suit be filed in a ‘proper’ court and filing in a court of improper venue
does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the defendant.”58 If the court
49. See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 641.
50. See id.; see also William Wirt Blume, Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1,
35-39 (1949).
51. See Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 641.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. Alan J. Lazarus, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Service of Process Issues in Litigation
Involving a Foreign Party, 31 TORT & INS. L.J. 29, 67 (1995); see also Adoor & Simeone, supra
note 13, at 641.
55. Lazarus, supra note 54, at 67. For a more in-depth discussion on the distinction between
transitory and local actions, see Blume, supra note 50, at 36-9.
56. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
57. 892 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
58. Richardson, 892 S.W.2d at 755-56 (citing State ex rel. DePaul Health Ctr. v. Mummert,
870 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)).
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has jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property, but venue is improper,
“it inures to the benefit of the parties and the judicial system, for the purpose of
efficient administration of justice, to bring the issue to the trial court’s attention
at the earliest possible time.”59 If the trial court determines that venue is
improper, it must transfer the case to a court where venue is proper.60 Yet, if a
court lacks jurisdiction over an action and improper venue exists, the court is
deemed to be powerless to transfer the case.61 “Instead, the court must dismiss
the case without prejudice, allowing plaintiff the opportunity to file the action
in the appropriate court.”62 Thus, jurisdiction and venue can be distinguished
by the fact that jurisdiction relates to the court’s power to hear and determine a
case, while venue is the place where a case is to be tried.63
Venue statutes are designed to “protect defendants from being haled into
distant courts . . . [and] discourage plaintiffs from shopping for the most
generous jury pool . . . .”64 The place where a case is to be tried, however, has
proven to be a catalyst for litigation in Missouri for as long as Missouri has
recognized the concept of venue. The reason for this litigation is that locating
the site of a cause of action in the most hospitable forum is important to both
plaintiffs and defendants. The importance of finding an advantageous forum
causes plaintiffs (and to a lesser extent defendants) to enter into protracted
procedural posturing. Yet, regardless of all the creative arguments and
procedural techniques utilized by the parties to a lawsuit, both parties are still
ultimately constrained by the language of the Missouri venue statutes and the
court’s interpretation of those statutes. To understand how the Supreme Court
of Missouri has arrived at its current interpretation of corporate venue, it is
necessary to further expound upon the development of the corporate venue
statute in Missouri.
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF VENUE IN MISSOURI
“Venue in Missouri is determined solely by statute.”65 Missouri venue
statutes can be traced back to a period when Missouri had not yet even
achieved statehood.66 Yet, even today Missouri venue statutes still manage to
adhere to the local versus transitory distinction, which was established and
relied upon centuries ago in England.67 Suits brought against individuals or
corporations are today considered to be transitory in nature and may be filed in
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

State ex rel. Johnson v. Griffin, 945 S.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).
Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197.
Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 643.
Id. at 643-44.
See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197.
Lazarus, supra note 54, at 67.
Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 196.
See, e.g., LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF LOUISIANA, Ch. 38 (1807).
See Blume, supra note 51.
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the county of the defendant’s residence or in the county where the defendant
may be found.68
There are eight general venue provisions found in Chapter 508 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes.69 “The applicability of these provisions depends
primarily on the type of defendant being sued, and . . . on the types of entities
that are sued.”70 It should be noted, however, that there are also a wide variety
of special venue provisions that are relevant to specific acts.71 For our
purposes, only sections 508.010 and 508.040 will be discussed. In addition to
these sections, section 351.375 also requires analysis because the court has
relied upon it to place corporate residence at the location of the corporation’s
registered agent when section 508.010 is the applicable venue statute. Before
delving into a historical analysis of section 508.040, though, it is necessary to
mention a few words regarding section 508.010.
A.

The General Venue Statute

Dating back to 1825,72 the Missouri code specified that venue was proper
in any county in which any individual defendant resided or in the county where
the plaintiff resided at the time of service if defendant could be found in that
county.73 The language of section 508.010(2) has remained relatively
unchanged since its inception. In fact, “[t]here has been relatively little
litigation over the literal interpretation of the various provisions of section
508.010.”74 The same cannot be said, however, for section 508.040. And
while “[t]he development of the statute over the years does not throw much
light on the situation, other than to display a consistent pattern of broadly
subjecting corporations to suit,”75 it is nevertheless important to see how in fact
the corporate venue statute developed.

68. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 197.
69. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 508.010-.072 (1994).
70. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 639.
71. There are numerous special venue provisions that indicate where a suit may be brought
upon a cause of action filed pursuant to a particular law. For example, section 210.829.4 of the
Uniform Parentage Act, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 210.817-.852 (West 1996), is a special venue statute
which provides that a paternity action (or any other action brought under the Act) “may be
brought in the county in which the child resides, the mother resides, or the alleged father
resides. . . .” MO. REV. STAT. § 210.829.4 (1994). This Comment will only focus on those venue
statutes relating to corporate residence. Hence, it is necessary that “attorneys filing suit in
Missouri pursuant to a particular act should look to the venue provisions of that act, rather than to
the general venue provisions of chapter 508.” Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 639 n.4.
72. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 2, § 3 (1825).
73. Id.
74. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 13, at 652.
75. State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Mo. 1978) (en banc). The Webb case
provides an abbreviated, yet informative, discussion on the development of section 508.040. See
id. at 114-15.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2001]

B.

TWISTED CURRENTS

1067

The Corporate Venue Statute

The first corporate venue statute in Missouri can be traced back to the
Revised Statutes of 1845.76 Chapter 34 of that statute was divided into two
articles. Article I concerned a corporation’s general powers, while Article II
spoke to corporate venue.77 Article II, section 4 provided:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced in the proper court of the
county wherein the general meetings of the members, or the officers of such
corporation, have usually been holden, or by law, ought to have been holden.78

A revision of Article II, section 4 occurred in 1855 and drastically changed
the language of the corporate venue statute. The revised Article II, section 4
read as follows:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced, either in the county where the
cause of action accrued, or in any county where such corporation shall have, or
usually keep, an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary
business.79

The change represented by the 1855 revision is very similar to the current
corporate venue statute codified at section 508.040. In fact, since 1855 only
two changes have occurred to the actual statutory language. The first of these
changes occurred in 1866, when the Missouri legislature decided to delete the
comma following the word “commenced” and to change the final clause’s
mentioning of the word “corporation” to the plural “corporations.”80 Thus, the
1866 revision provided:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the
cause of action accrued, or in any county where such corporations shall have or
usually keep an office or agent for the transaction of their usual and customary
business.81

While the change to the plural form “corporations” may be thought of as
relatively minor at face value, it was actually a very significant change because
it instigated litigation, albeit more than a century later, that forced the Supreme
Court of Missouri to confront the issue of whether section 508.040 applied
when each of the several defendants were corporations. In State ex rel. Webb
v. Satz,82 the court held that “[t]he statute applies . . . when the only defendant
76. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34 (1845) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998)).
77. State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113, 114 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
78. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34, art. II., §4 (1845) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040
(1998)).
79. MO. REV. STAT. ch. 34, art. II., §4 (1855) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040
(1998)).
80. Webb, 561 S.W.2d at 114.
81. MO. REV. STAT. tit. XXIV, ch. 62, §26 (1866) (current version at MO. REV. STAT. §
508.040 (1998)).
82. Webb, 561 S.W.2d 113.
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is a single corporation, but to declare that it has no application when there are
plural defendants, all corporations, is to ignore the broad language with which
the statute begins.”83 Thus, a suit filed against one or more corporate
defendants may be brought in any county where at least one of the corporate
defendants maintains an office or agent for the transaction of business.84 The
court’s reliance in Webb on the statutory history of section 508.040 evidences
why it is an important aspect of our discussion. Without a firm understanding
as to how the statutory language has evolved since its inception, one cannot
begin to understand how and why the court has arrived at their current
statutory interpretation.
The second change to the 1855 version occurred in 1903 when provisions
were added pertaining to suits against railroad companies. The addition of this
language, though, did not affect the prior corporate venue provisions. And
since 1903, the corporate venue statute has remained unchanged and currently
reads in full as follows:
Suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the
cause of action accrued, or in case the corporation defendant is a railroad
company owning, controlling or operating a railroad running into or through
two or more counties in this state, then in either of such counties or in any
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent
for the transaction of their usual and customary business.85

Now that it has been shown how the corporate venue statute has developed
in Missouri, let our focus of attention turn to the development of section
351.375. It is this section that has come to be interpreted as the designator of
corporate residence when section 508.010 is deemed to be the applicable venue
statute.
C. The Registered Agent Concept
The concept of a registered agent for the service of process was not
introduced to Missouri law until 1943. The General Assembly adopted The
General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri in 1943.86 Complexity
concerning the issue of corporate residence began to spread upon the
introduction of this concept; it did not stem from the venue statutes themselves,
as they in all actuality are relatively clear. Sections 9, 10 and 11 of the 1943
Act related to the registered agent for service of process and were entitled as
follows:

83. Id. at 115.
84. Id.
85. MO. REV. STAT. § 508.040 (1998).
86. The General and Business Corporation Act of Missouri, 1943 Mo. Laws 410, 414
(current version at MO. REV. STAT. § 351.010 (1998)).
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Section 9.

Each corporation shall continuously maintain a registered office
and a registered agent—address shall be stated in articles of
incorporation.

Section 10.

A corporation may change address of its registered office, how.

Section 11.

Capacity of registered agent of corporation.87

1069

Section 10, which is now codified under section 351.375, contains the alleged
venue culprit provision:
The location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all purposes
to be in the county where its registered office is maintained.88

Section 351.375 was actually derived from section 12 of the 1933 Illinois
Business Corporation Act.89 The alleged venue culprit sentence, however, was
not found in the Illinois statute. Instead, it was introduced in section 10 of
House Bill 64 and remained unchanged until the law was passed in 1943.90
It is important to note that the term “corporation” as used today in Chapter
351 does not apply to foreign corporations pursuant to 351.015(6).91 A foreign
corporation is defined under section 351.015(7) as “a corporation for profit
organized under laws other than the laws of this state . . . .”92 Hence, section
351.375 only applies to domestic corporations.93 Although section 351.375
states that “the location or residence of any corporation shall be deemed for all
purposes to be in the county where its registered office is maintained,” the
equivalent provision applicable to foreign corporations, section 351.588,94
contains no such language concerning the residence of foreign corporations.
Prior to the enactment of section 351.588, section 351.62595 was the applicable
statute, and it actually referenced section 351.375. When the General
Assembly enacted section 351.588 in 1990, the legislature not only repealed
section 351.625 and its reference to section 351.375, but it enacted the
provision without language establishing the residence of a foreign corporation
to be “for all purposes” the county in which it maintained its registered
office.96 Therefore, one should remember that prior to 1990, sections 351.375

87. Id. at 419-20.
88. Id. at 420. See MO. REV. STAT. § 351.375(2) (emphasis added).
89. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Mo. 1960) (en banc); see also
Business Corporation Act, 1933 Ill. Laws 316.
90. Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 634.
91. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(6) (1998).
92. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.015(7) (1998).
93. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 (1998) (statutes apply to foreign
corporations).
94. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.588 (1998).
95. MO. REV. STAT. § 351.625 (repealed 1990).
96. See H.R. 1432, 85th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1990).
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and 351.625 were ensconced together in the amalgam of statutory
interpretation.
Since O’Keefe97 in 1951, the court has held that section 351.375 dictates
where a corporation’s residence is to be located when that corporation is
brought into a suit pursuant to section 508.010. Yet, the court’s construction
of corporate residence has not always been this way. Prior to the introduction
of the registered agent concept in 1943, the case of State ex rel. Henning v.
Williams98 firmly settled all questions of corporate residence for venue
purposes. Thus, it is now time to revisit the period prior to 1943 in which no
predecessor statutes spoke of a registered agent. From there, it will become
apparent exactly when the Supreme Court of Missouri lapsed into the quagmire
of confused statutory construction regarding corporate residence. Once one
understands how and why the court has continued to perpetuate such an
illogical construction, one can then understand why the need for change
beckons so loudly today.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW REGARDING CORPORATE RESIDENCE
A.

Application of the General Venue Statute

The 1926 case of State ex rel. Columbia National Bank of Kansas City v.
Davis99 was a landmark case that squarely presented the Supreme Court of
Missouri with the opportunity to decide whether the general venue statute
(section 508.010) or the corporate venue statute (section 508.040) fixed venue
of civil actions against corporations when they are joined with individual
defendants. The case of Columbia National Bank centered on a plaintiff who
attempted to bring suit against both a corporation and individual defendants in
a county where one of the individual defendants resided, notwithstanding the
fact that the corporate defendant did not maintain an office or agent for the
transaction of its business in that county.100
The defendant in Columbia National Bank advanced the argument that
when a corporation is a defendant, section 508.040 is the applicable venue
statute regardless of whether the corporation is joined as a defendant with one
or more individual defendants. The plaintiff conceded, and the court
acknowledged, that had the plaintiff brought suit solely against the corporation,
section 508.040 would have applied and suit could not have been brought in
the same county since the corporation did not maintain an office or agent in
that county.101 Yet, the plaintiff argued that when both a corporation and
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).
131 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1939) (en banc).
284 S.W. 464 (Mo. 1926) (en banc).
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
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individuals are defendants to a suit, section 508.010 should be the applicable
venue statute. And in fact, that is exactly what the court held—“section
[508.010] fixes the venue of civil actions against corporations where they are
joined as defendants with one or more other defendants, and . . . section
[508.040] fixes such venue only in actions where the corporation defendant is
the sole defendant.”102 The court also stated that “[sections 508.010] and
[508.040] should be construed together and a meaning given to each which
will not destroy the other . . . .”103
B.

The General Venue Statute and Corporate Residence

In 1939, Henning further expounded on the decision rendered in Columbia
National Bank. In Henning, the plaintiff brought suit against an individual
resident of St. Charles County and a foreign corporation licensed to do
business in Missouri.104 The corporation had an office for the transaction of its
business in the City of St. Louis. Section 508.010 was the applicable venue
statute in Henning, according to the previous holding in Columbia National
Bank, since there was a mixture of corporate and individual defendants. Yet,
while the issue in Columbia National Bank was which statute applied, the issue
in Henning was where the corporate defendant’s residence was pursuant to
section 508.010.105
Forced to reconcile sections 508.010 and 508.040, the court in Henning
held that because a corporation’s residence when sued alone was in any county
where the corporation had an office or agent for the transaction of its business
under section 508.040, the corporation’s residence should be regarded as
established in the same way when it is joined as a defendant with another
under section 508.010. Referring to the general venue statute, the court stated
that it could “see no reason why [the corporate defendant’s] residence should
not be regarded as established in the same way when, perchance, they are
joined as defendants with another, thereby fixing the venue under [section
508.040].”106
Notice that the holding in Henning is in stark contrast to the decision
rendered in O’Keefe only a few years later. The rationale given in Henning for
the court’s reliance on section 508.040 as the means of dictating corporate
residence pursuant to section 508.010 can actually be traced back to that given
in Columbia National Bank: “Said sections of the statute should be held in pari

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 470.
Id.
Henning, 131 S.W.2d at 562.
Id.
Id. at 565.
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materia.”107 The court in Columbia National Bank endeavored to present the
following definition regarding pari materia:
Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or to
the same class of persons or things. In the construction of a particular statute,
or in the interpretation of any of its provisions, all acts relating to the same
subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with
it, as together constituting one law. The endeavor should be made, by tracing
the history of legislation on the subject . . . . So far as reasonably possible the
statutes, although seemingly in conflict with each other, should be harmonized,
and force and effect given to each, as it will not be presumed that the
Legislature, in the enactment of a subsequent statute, intended to repeal an
earlier one, unless it has done so in express terms; nor will it be presumed that
the Legislature intended to leave on the statute books two contradictory
enactments.108

The decision handed down in Henning was short-lived. No longer would a
corporation’s residence for venue purposes when joined with an individual be
in the county where it maintained an office of the transaction of its business.
O’Keefe, which came before the court after the registered agent concept had
been introduced to Missouri law, was the case that effectively changed the
construction of corporate residence.109 In O’Keefe, suit was brought in Dade
County against an individual defendant who was a resident of Gentry County
and a Missouri corporation.110 The corporation was a common carrier and had
its registered office and registered agent located in Jasper County.111 The
plaintiff premised venue in Dade County because the corporation operated a
bus line in Dade County.112 The cause of action, however, actually accrued in
Vernon County.113 The issue before the court was the same as in Henning:
What is the residence of a corporation for venue purposes when both a
corporation and an individual are sued together? While the issues might have
been the same, the decisions rendered could not have been more different.
C. Overturning Henning: A New Statutory Construction
The court in O’Keefe recognized that the plaintiff was operating under the
theory that “the residence of a corporation is wherever it operates and has an
office and agent.”114 The court did not agree with that theory, however. To
that effect, the holding in Henning was overruled as the court in O’Keefe held
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Columbia National, 284 S.W. at 470.
Id. at 470.
State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 305.
O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 306.
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that the legal residence of a corporation is fixed by the location of its registered
agent when a corporation is sued together with an individual.115 The court
looked to the registered agent concept as outlined in section 351.375 to provide
the location of corporate residence under section 508.010. The court stated
that section 351.375 “applies with equal force to venue statutes.”116 Thus,
venue was found to be improper in Dade County.
Just three years after O’Keefe, State ex rel. Whiteman v. James117 presented
the court the opportunity to drive home the notion that when section 508.010 is
the applicable venue statute, a corporation’s residence is located in the county
of its registered agent for the service of process. In Whiteman, the cause of
action accrued in Holt County and plaintiff brought suit in Jackson County
against an individual defendant who was a resident of Andrew County and a
foreign corporation. The foreign corporation maintained an office for the
transaction of its business in Jackson County and had a registered agent located
in the City of St. Louis. The court noted that essentially the only difference
between O’Keefe and Whiteman was the fact that the corporation in O’Keefe
was a domestic corporation while the corporation in Whiteman was foreign.118
The court deemed this distinction insignificant. Rather, the focus in Whiteman
was the “for all purposes”119 language contained in section 351.375.
During the period of time in which Whiteman was considered, section
351.625 was the applicable statute in regard to foreign corporations. Since it
referenced section 351.375, the court was allowed to construe section 351.375
as dictating corporate residence regardless of whether the corporation was
domestic or foreign. As shall soon become apparent, though, sections 351.625
and 351.375 were found to be replete with wrinkles that allowed for
applicative maneuverability.
The issue in Whiteman was practically the same as that presented in
Henning: “[W]hether a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
[Missouri] and having an office and place of business in some county is a
resident of that county” under section 508.010.120 The plaintiff in Whiteman
relied on the decision rendered in Henning because it answered the issue in the
affirmative. The defendant, though, asserted that the holding in Henning was
prior to when the residence provisions of section 351.375 were enacted. The
court held that this issue was properly settled in O’Keefe, whereby it was
determined that section 351.375 dictates a corporation’s residence at the

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 265 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1954) (en banc).
118. Id. at 300.
119. MO. REV STAT. § 351.375 (1998).
120. Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 299 (citing State ex rel. Henning v. Williams, 131 S.W.2d 561,
562 (Mo. 1939) (en banc)).
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location of its registered agent.121 Basically, while O’Keefe stood for the
proposition that section 351.375 applied to domestic corporations when section
508.010 was applicable, Whiteman extended this theory to also apply to
foreign corporations.
Yet, it is in Whiteman that one can see the first signs of reproach
concerning the court’s corporate venue statutory construction. Judge Hyde, in
his dissent, noted that “[w]hile [section 351.375] is sufficient to authorize
service on a corporation at its registered office, it is not a venue statute.”122
Continuing, Judge Hyde stated: “I do not think this general provision should be
held to control over the specific provisions of sections 508.010 and 508.040,
which were intended as venue statutes and which were left unamended.”123
Furthermore, he explained that “the most reasonable construction is that
[section 351.375] only adds another office (the registered office) to those
where service can be made and venue established.”124 Thus, “while by
[section 351.375], a corporation may have a residence at its registered office
for all purposes including venue . . . it may also have other residences created
by statute for purposes of service and venue.”125
In fact, even the majority in Whiteman conceded that its statutory
construction would result in the anomaly of a plaintiff being able to sue a
corporation alone in one county under section 508.040, but not in that same
county if the corporation was joined with an individual resident of another
county.126 The majority questioned the accuracy of its holding. This
admonition, as well as Judge Hyde’s dissent, rendered the court’s prior
statutory construction vulnerable to future criticism. Before more criticism
could be engendered, though, the case of State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield127
occasioned a new wrinkle for corporate venue construction.
D. The Foreign Corporation Distinction
In Stamm, the issue presented was whether an action might be maintained
against a foreign insurance corporation and an individual in the county where
the corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its business. The fact
that the corporation was an insurance company created an opportunity to
construe corporate venue anew. The court noted that at the time the case was
brought, sections 351.370, 351.375 and 351.380 governed domestic
corporations, while sections 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 applied to foreign

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 300.
Id. at 301 (Hyde, J. dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 302 (Hyde, J. dissenting).
Id. at 300.
340 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
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corporations.128 Yet, “insurance companies are not within the purview of these
statutes because they are among the corporations specifically excepted by [the]
provisions of [section] 351.690.”129
The court in Stamm relied on the following provisions of section 351.690,
which read in relevant part:
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to existing corporations
as follows:
(1) Those provisions of this law . . . shall be applicable, to the same extent and
with the same effect, to all existing corporations, domestic and foreign. . . ;
(2) No provision of this law, other than those mentioned in subdivision (1),
shall be applicable to banks, trust companies, insurance companies,
building and loan associations, savings bank and safe deposit companies,
mortgage loan companies, and nonprofit corporations; . . .130

Further, section 375.210 required insurance companies to appoint the
superintendent of insurance as their registered agent for service of process.
The court held, however, that section 375.210 was a service statute, not a
venue statute.131 Hence, while venue in a suit against a foreign insurance
corporation and an individual was indeed governed by section 508.010, the
residence of the foreign insurance corporation was in the county where it
maintained an office for the transaction of its business. In accordance with this
holding, the court overruled Whiteman to the extent that it held section 351.375
was applicable to foreign corporations.132 With Whiteman now overruled in
part by Stamm, State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen133 became a case that once again
concerned the residence of a foreign corporation for venue purposes when both
a corporation and an individual are sued together.
Prior to Bowden, Whiteman dictated that the residence of both domestic
and foreign corporations under section 508.010 was controlled by section
351.375. But with the decision rendered in Stamm, the court in Bowden found
it necessary to further elaborate on the domestic versus foreign corporation
distinction. The plaintiff in Bowden contended that the residence of a foreign
corporation, when joined with an individual defendant, should be governed by
section 508.040.134 The court was quick to point out, however, that section
508.040 only applies when a corporation is the sole defendant.135 Thus,

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 633 (quoting 1943 Mo. laws 410) (emphasis added).
Id. at 634.
Stamm, 340 S.W.2d at 634.
359 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 345.
Id.
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regardless of whether the corporation is domestic or foreign, section 508.040
will only apply if that corporation is sued alone.
The court went on to mention that “[a]s far as domestic corporations
organized under the general business laws of Missouri are concerned that issue
is settled by the closing sentence of [section 351.375].”136 Regarding foreign
corporations, though, sections 351.620, 351.625 and 351.630 are the applicable
statutes.137 The court held that a foreign corporation resides in the county
where its registered office and registered agent is located under section
351.620.138 While a different statute was utilized to confer corporate residence
for a foreign corporation pursuant to section 508.010, the court noted its
conclusion was supported by Whiteman and that Bowden did not overrule
Whiteman to any further extent than did Stamm.139
Judge Storckman, however, did not agree with the majority. He opined of
O’Keefe, Whiteman and Bowden that none of them correctly construed section
351.375.140 He agreed with Judge Hyde’s dissent in Whiteman that section
351.375 merely adds another potential place in which venue might be
established.141 “The O’Keefe and Whiteman cases seem to regard the
provision [section 351.375] as if it reads ‘for all purposes of venue,’ but it does
not have that effect. At best, venue is only one of several purposes
involved.”142 Judge Storckman believed that “the legislative intent was to
make sure that another place of venue and service was designated or continued
as it was under the prior law; it was not the legislative intent to destroy the
effectiveness of [section 508.010(2)] as it had been interpreted and construed
in the Henning case.”143 Finally, Judge Storckman cautioned that the majority
opinion could give rise to implicit corporate forum shopping, whereby
“corporations, by a judicious choice of a registered office, will be given greater
control over the place where they can be sued with other defendants . . . .”144
Since Judge Storckman had written the majority opinion in Stamm holding
that section 375.210 was merely a service statute with respect to insurance
corporations, he wanted to adopt that rationale to support the conclusion that
section 351.375 was also a service statute and not a venue statute with respect
to business corporations. Yet, while Judge Storckman’s majority opinion in

136. Id. at 349.
137. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 351.620, 351.625, 351.630 (1998) (pertaining to foreign
corporations).
138. Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at 351.
139. Id.
140. See State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 351 (Mo. 1962) (en banc)
(Storckman, J., dissenting).
141. See id.
142. Id. at 353.
143. Id. at 354.
144. Id.
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Stamm had provided that the residence of a foreign insurance company under
section 508.010(2) was not governed by section 375.210 and therefore not in
the county of the corporation’s registered agent, he failed to articulate just
where that insurance corporation’s residence should be.
E.

The Insurance Corporation Distinction

Consequently, the case of State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher145
presented the court with the opportunity to decide that very issue. Rothermich
was a landmark case because, as the court realized, “Missouri courts have
heretofore established no definitive definition of residence of foreign insurance
corporations for purposes of [section] 508.010(2).”146 In Rothermich, the
cause of action accrued in St. Charles County.147 Suit was brought in the City
of St. Louis against an individual defendant who resided in St. Louis County
and a foreign insurance corporation authorized to do business in Missouri.148
The insurance corporation maintained an office for the transaction of its
business in the city of St. Louis, and had designated the Director of Insurance
to receive service of process on the corporation’s behalf.149 Service of process
on the Director occurred in Cole County.150
This issue was analogous to that in Stamm: Where to locate the residence
of a foreign insurance corporation for venue purposes under section 508.010
when one or more corporations are being sued together with one or more
individuals? Before delving into this issue, the court sought to make a few
points clear: (1) when any corporation is the sole defendant, regardless of
whether it is foreign or domestic, insurance or business, section 508.040 is the
applicable venue statute;151 (2) when one or more corporations are sued
together with one or more individuals, section 508.010 is the applicable venue
statute;152 and (3) with regard to venue under section 508.010, foreign
insurance corporations are treated differently than both domestic and foreign
general business corporations.153
With these three key points in mind, the court then answered the question
as to where the foreign insurance corporation’s residence was located under
section 508.010. “Since Chapter 351 excludes insurance corporations from
applicability, the definition of residence for business corporations taken from
[section 351.375] has been found to be inapplicable to insurance
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
Id. at 197.
See id. at 196.
See id.
See id.
See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 196.
See id. at 197.
See id.
See id.
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corporations.”154 In addition, statutory law does not mandate that insurance
corporations maintain a registered agent in Missouri. As mentioned in Stamm,
“[s]ince foreign insurance corporations are not required to designate a
registered office and registered agent under the general corporation laws, the
construction placed upon [section] 351.375 . . . has no application . . . .”155
“Accordingly, this court holds the language of [section] 508.040 . . . to be
persuasive in determining the definition of ‘residence’ of a foreign insurance
corporation, pursuant to [section] 508.010.”156 Therefore, the location of a
foreign insurance corporation’s residence under section 508.010 is “in any
county where such corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent
for the transaction of their usual and customary business.”157 The court in
Rothermich apparently wished to cover all of the bases regarding its new
interpretative stance on an insurance corporation’s residence. Consequently,
the court even advanced a definition of “agent” for venue purposes with
respect to insurance corporations that was set forth in State ex rel. Cameron
Mutual Insurance Company v. Reeves.158 The court determined that “‘one who
is employed under an agreement to accomplish results on behalf of his
principal whom he represents [is an insurance agent for venue
purposes]’. . . .”159 Utilizing this rationale, the court found venue to be proper
in the City of St. Louis because the residence of a foreign insurance
corporation is in any county where it maintains an office or agent for the
transaction of its business, that is, the selling of insurance policies.160
The insurance corporation in Rothermich was a foreign corporation.161
And that is why the defendant in State ex rel. Smith v. Gray162 argued that the
Rothermich holding did not control. In Smith, suit was brought in Jackson
County against a Missouri insurance corporation, a general business
corporation, and an individual.163 It was conceded that section 508.010 was
the applicable venue statute, but at issue was the residence of a domestic
The insurance
insurance corporation pursuant to section 508.010.164
corporation had listed in its articles of incorporation that the location of its
principal office was in Boone County, but it also maintained an office in

154. Id. at 198.
155. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield, 340 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Mo. 1960) (en banc).
156. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
157. MO. ANN. STAT. § 508.040 (West 1998).
158. 727 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
159. Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 201 (quoting State ex rel. Cameron Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reeves,
727 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
160. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 201.
161. See id. at 196.
162. State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
163. See id. at 191.
164. See id.
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Jackson County for the sale of insurance policies.165 The plaintiff brought suit
in Jackson County because the insurance corporation had an office in that
county. The question before the court was whether that county was the proper
residence for the insurance corporation under section 508.010, or whether
Boone County was the location of residence for venue purposes.
In response to this issue, the court stated, “unlike general and business
corporations, no statute makes [the location of the principal office] the
residence of an insurance corporation.”166 The court then proceeded to discuss
how the 1943 law only affected general business corporations. Following this
discussion, the court held that
[b]y changing the law for general and business corporations but not for
insurance companies, the legislature left intact this Court’s definition of
‘residence’ for insurance corporations. Under sections 508.010(2) and
508.040, foreign and domestic insurance corporations ‘reside’ for venue
purposes in any county where they have or usually keep an office or agent for
the transaction of their usual and customary business.167

F.

An Opportunity for Change: An Opportunity Lost

Since O’Keefe,168 the Supreme Court of Missouri has heard a multitude of
cases concerning a corporation’s residence for venue purposes. Many of these
cases have attempted to change the court’s interpretation of the venue statutes
by introducing new ripples into the stream of corporate venue. The court has
consistently managed to calm these ripples, albeit with the one exception
regarding insurance corporations. Yet, just because the stream of corporate
venue may appear to be smooth on the surface does not mean that twisted
currents are not lurking beneath. And that is exactly what the cases of State ex
rel. Armstrong v. Mason169 and State ex rel. Taylor v. Clark170 sought to
expose—the twisted currents of an overly complex and illogical interpretation
underneath the stream of corporate venue decisions.
In Armstrong, the cause of action accrued in Webster County.171 The
plaintiff brought suit against an individual and a corporate defendant. The
individual defendant was a resident of Greene County, while the corporate
defendant was a Delaware corporation that maintained its registered office and
agent for service of process in St. Louis County.172 The corporate defendant,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
2000).
172.

See id. at 191-92.
State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).
State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1951) (en banc).
State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000) (en banc).
State ex rel. Taylor v. Clark, No. SC82915 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
Relator’s Brief at 2, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14,
Id.
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however, maintained an office for the transaction of its usual and customary
business in the City of St. Louis. Plaintiff initially brought suit solely against
the corporate defendant in the City of St. Louis, basing venue on the corporate
venue statute. The next day, however, the plaintiff filed a First Amended
Petition whereby the individual defendant was joined. While Armstrong dealt
in part with the concept of ‘pretensive nonjoinder’ as discussed above in the
section on procedural posturing,173 the case really centered on the issue of
corporate venue.
The defendants sought to transfer the case from the City of St. Louis based
upon improper venue. Judge David C. Mason of the Circuit Court of the City
of St. Louis, however, denied the motion to transfer.174 So too did the Eastern
District Court of Appeals, as it denied the defendants’ petition for writ of
prohibition.175 Hence, the case came before the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The defendants/relator contended that the respondent judge erred in
holding that venue was proper in the City of St. Louis.176 They argued using
the O’Keefe rationale that section 351.375 determines corporate residence
when section 508.010 has been invoked as the applicable venue statute due to
there being a mix of corporate and non-corporate defendants.177 The relator
stated that “[i]t is self-evident that, by enacting two separate statutes, the
legislature of Missouri intended that a distinction be made between corporate
defendants and individual defendants when determining proper venue.”178
Furthermore, the relator stated that “[i]f Missouri’s venue statutes are to be
changed, the General Assembly is the proper forum for change, not the
Court.”179
The respondent, however, maintained that “[c]onstruction of [s]ection
508.010, [s]ection 508.040 and the business corporation statute in pari materia
indicate that the ‘all purposes’ language of [s]ection 351.375 merely creates an
additional venue choice.”180 The respondent sought to have the court
reconsider its prior holdings in such cases as O’Keefe, Whiteman and Bowden
and to construe the “for all purposes of venue” provision in section 351.375 to
173. See supra Part I.D and text accompanying notes 41-46.
174. Relator’s Brief at 3, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14,
2000).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 17.
177. Id. at 20.
178. Id. at 18.
179. Relator’s Brief at 23-24, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed
Nov. 14, 2000).
180. Respondent’s Brief at 28, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed
Nov. 14, 2000). See also State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Mo. 1998) (Wolff, J.,
concurring); State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 351 (Mo. 1962) (Storckman, J.,
dissenting); State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. 1954) (Hyde, J.,
dissenting).
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stand not as a preclusionary provision against any other location for the
purpose of venue, but rather as an inclusionary provision whereby the location
of the corporation’s registered agent is simply an additional venue choice.181
In Taylor, which was actually a companion case to Armstrong, corporate
residence for venue purposes was once again the central issue. Yet, Judge
Thomas C. Clark of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri held opposite
that of Judge Mason in Armstrong. Thus, two cases with virtually identical
venue issues were decided differently at the circuit court level. Hence, the
Supreme Court of Missouri became the appropriate body to determine the
outcome and resolve the discrepancy.
An opportunity was before the court to look upon its prior holdings, to
notice the unnecessary complexity that has been perpetuated and to set forth a
new statutory construction. The court, though, failed to capitalize on this
opportunity. In an amazing and unique turn of events, the court ruled in favor
of the respondent in Armstrong and also in favor of the respondent in Taylor.
Remember, the respondent judge in Armstrong declined to transfer venue
whereas the judge in Taylor did transfer venue. This judicial anomaly resulted
from the Supreme Court of Missouri rotating the judges after hearing oral
arguments for each case. Thus, four justices heard arguments for both cases
while the other three judges were different for each case. The lack of
uniformity on the court resulted in a split decision. And as a result, an opinion
was not written and neither case carries any precedential value.
G. Analysis
During the course of navigation down the stream of corporate venue, from
its inception to its current interpretation by the Supreme Court of Missouri, it is
apparent that somewhere along the stream a divergence occurred. It was a
divergence between philosophies, between what the legislature originally
intended when it enacted the corporate venue statute and what the court now
perceives to be the correct interpretation of that statute. Luckily, when this
divergence occurred can be pinpointed with exactness. Furthermore, the
reason for that separation can even be identified; it was the introduction of
section 351.375 into Missouri law in 1943. Once section 351.375 came to be
interpreted by the court as the statute that provides for a corporation’s
residence in the county where its registered agent is located under section
508.010, illogical results began to occur.
For purposes of section 508.010, sections 508.040 and 351.375 are in
conflict. Section 508.040 dictates venue when a corporation is the sole
defendant. Yet, section 351.375 negates that statute when a corporation is
joined with an individual defendant. Hence, “the determination of proper
181. Respondent’s Brief at 25-26, State ex rel. Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed
Nov. 14, 2000).
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venue for a corporation turns on the essentially inconsequential presence of a
single unincorporated defendant.”182 This is illogical.
A plaintiff should be able to bring suit against a corporate defendant in the
county where the corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its
business, regardless of whether an individual defendant is joined in the suit.
The majority’s rationale in Bowden, however, attempts to refute this
interpretative stance. But as Judge Storckman expressed in his dissent in
Bowden, “[s]tatutes should not be construed so as to render another statute
meaningless unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly expressed . . . .”183
The current construction of section 351.375 when section 508.010 is the
applicable venue statute does in fact render another statute (section 508.040)
meaningless. Yet, the majority of the court in Bowden found this to be
acceptable.184
As support for their holding that section 508.040 should not provide the
residence of a corporation for venue purposes when section 508.010 is the
applicable venue statute, the court in Bowden posited the following question,
which will be applied to the characters in the example from section II:
[I]f plaintiff ‘A’ brings a suit against corporation ‘Z’ and individual defendant
‘B’ in the City of St. Louis, how would defendant ‘B’ go about determining
whether the venue of the suit in the City of St. Louis was or was not proper as
to him?185

The court asked this question because it believed that were corporation Z to
“reside” in any county in the state in which it had an office for the transaction
of its business, then defendant B would be faced with an uncertain issue of
fact. And that issue would be whether Z was doing business as usual and
customary in that county.
This rationale, however, is superfluous. The court’s later decision in Webb
regarding multiple corporate defendants does a great deal of damage to the
Bowden court’s reasoning. When the court in Webb held that section 508.040
applied to multiple corporate defendants, must not the additional corporate
defendant pursuant to section 508.040 undergo the same discovery to ascertain
whether venue is appropriate to it? Since section 508.040 applies when one
corporation is the sole defendant and when one or more corporations are the
sole defendants, an individual defendant under section 508.010 is placed in the
same shoes as an additional corporate defendant under section 508.040. It is
not any more difficult for an individual defendant to determine whether a

182. Brief of Amicus Curiae Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys at 19, State ex rel.
Armstrong v. Mason, No. SC82669 (Mo. filed Nov. 14, 2000).
183. State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 354 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (Storckman,
J., dissenting).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 350.
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corporation is doing business as usual and customary in one county than it is
for another corporation seeking to determine the same thing.
While Webb may have poked the first hole in the Bowden majority’s
rationale, the holding in Rothermich dealt it a crushing blow. In Rothermich, it
was held that section 508.040 located venue for insurance corporations
regardless of whether or not an individual was joined.186 Thus, if an individual
is sued along with an insurance corporation, that individual cannot rely on the
Bowden rationale that locating venue in the county where the insurance
corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its usual and customary
business would burden the individual defendant with an uncertain issue of fact
as to whether that insurance corporation was doing business as usual and
customary in that county. If the Bowden rationale cannot apply when an
insurance corporation is a party, why should it be allowed to have merit when a
general business corporation is a defendant? Is the burden on the individual
defendant that much greater when a general business corporation is involved
rather than an insurance corporation? The answer is clearly no.
While the decisions in Webb and Rothermich may have swept the Bowden
majority’s rationale out of the stream of corporate venue, it unfortunately did
not negate the holding of Bowden. Something more was needed to overturn
the precedent established long ago in O’Keefe and perpetuated by its progeny.
And that something more has finally arrived. As this Comment has shown,
there is little if any rationale remaining to support the court’s current
interpretative stance. The court’s statutory construction has navigated the
court down the stream of corporate venue. The decisions resulting from this
statutory construction have built a seemingly solid ship for sailing down that
stream. The ship’s sails, however, have become flaccid as a result of there no
longer being the wind of rationale to keep them full. Rather, the wind of
change now blows. And it is a harsh wind. A wind stirring as a consequence
of the illogical results promulgated by the court’s current interpretative stance.
This wind has created ever-heightening waves lunging at the chance to sink
that ship. The ship now sits slowly listing. And it is only when that ship sinks
that the wind of change will subside and the twisted currents of corporate
venue will finally be quelled.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
While illogical results can be found in such cases as O’Keefe, Whiteman,
Bowden and in the companion cases of Armstrong and Taylor,187 another

186. See State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).
187. See also State ex rel. Dick Proctor Imps., Inc. v. Gaertner, 671 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984)
(en banc), where suit was brought against four corporations and one individual. The court held
that section 508.010 was the applicable venue statute and that venue was proper in the City of St.
Louis since one corporation maintained a registered agent at that location. Id.
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example whereby the court’s interpretation of corporate venue has an
anomalous effect can be found in the example outlined in Part I of this
Comment. For it is in that example that venue is proper in the City of St. Louis
if A brings suit solely against the corporation, but venue will be improper in the
City of St. Louis if A brings suit against both Z and the individual defendant B.
In all of these cases, venue was found to be improper in the county where the
corporation had an office for the transaction of its business. This is an
anomaly of statutory construction, because had any of the corporations been
the sole defendant in any of those cases, venue would have been found to be
proper. The plaintiff should be able to bring suit against corporation Z in the
county where Z maintains an office for the transaction of its business,
regardless of whether or not individual defendant B is joined in the suit.
Even after the court acknowledged this anomalous result years ago in
Whiteman, why does the statutory construction allowing for this anomalous
result persist? Answering this question becomes even more difficult when one
considers how the court in Rothermich declared that “it is desirable to arrive at
a result where venue is applied more uniformly so that a myriad of venue rules
do not exist contributing to and encouraging litigation relating to venue
problems.”188 Unfortunately, a myriad of venue rules does exist. And it is this
myriad that places an unnecessary burden on the plaintiff to determine which
venue rules apply.
If the sole defendant is a corporation, then section 508.040 is the
applicable venue statute and the corporation’s residence is located in any
county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its usual and
customary business.189 Yet, if there is a corporate defendant and an individual
defendant, then section 508.010 governs.190 When section 508.010 governs,
the plaintiff must then look to section 351.375. But if the corporation is an
insurance corporation, section 351.375 is no longer applicable.191 Rather, it is
once again section 508.040. If there should happen to be a mix of general
business corporations and insurance corporations, in addition to individual
defendants, then section 508.040 only applies to the insurance corporations
whereas section 508.010 and section 351.375 determine the residence of the
general business corporations.

188. Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 200.
189. See State ex rel. O’Keefe v. Brown, 235 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo. 1951) (en banc); State ex
rel. Whiteman v. James, 265 S.W.2d 298, 299 (Mo. 1954) (en banc); State ex rel. Bowden v.
Jensen, 359 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Mo. 1962) (en banc); State ex rel. Webb v. Satz, 561 S.W.2d 113,
114 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
190. See O’Keefe, 235 S.W.2d at 306; Whiteman, 265 S.W.2d at 299; Bowden, 359 S.W.2d at
345.
191. See Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 198; State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190, 193
(Mo. 1998) (en banc).
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Instead of wondering why this illogical statutory construction has been
allowed to advance throughout the decades, it is more appropriate to delve into
how that statutory construction can be changed. A proposed solution, echoed
by Judges Hyde, Storckman and Wolff, is that sections 508.040 and 351.375
be interpreted so as to promote harmony among the two. Rather than having
section 351.375 negate section 508.040, section 351.375 should be construed
to provide another place of venue—not the exclusive place of venue under
section 508.010.
As Judge Wolff succinctly stated in his concurrence in Smith:
[T]he most logical way to reconcile the venue statutes and the business
corporation statute is to hold that a business corporation for venue purposes is
a resident of a county where it maintains an office for the transaction of its
usual business (section 508.040) and a resident of a county where it maintains
its registered office (section 351.375). To interpret sections 508.040 and
351.375 as each defining residence for venue purposes not only is logical, but
eliminates the strategic choice of joining an individual defendant for venue
purposes where, ordinarily, a plaintiff would not otherwise be inclined to do
so.192

It is illogical to hold that a corporation’s residence is in one county when the
corporation is the sole defendant, but that its residence is in a different county
when the corporation is joined with an individual. It is even more illogical
when one considers that it is often the case that the county where a corporate
defendant maintains its registered agent possesses no other nexus to the
underlying claim.
By eliminating the competition between sections 508.040 and 351.375
when section 508.010 is the applicable venue statute, controversial procedural
posturing by plaintiffs would be greatly decreased. A reduction in the need for
procedural posturing would result in a reduction in procedural-oriented
litigation. If the residence of a corporate defendant under section 508.010 was
either in the county where the corporation maintained an office for the
transaction of business or in the county where the corporation’s registered
agent was located, plaintiffs would not need to add or dismiss defendants
solely for the purpose of obtaining a hospitable forum, and defendants would
not need to question every action by the plaintiff.
This construction would also not harm defendant corporations, as it merely
combines the two statutorily designated locales where corporations can be
sued. It does not inflict upon them a new or altered location of corporate
residence. An insurance corporation’s residence pursuant to section 508.010 is
dictated by section 508.040. Hence, there is no reason that this concept cannot
be expanded to cover all corporations under section 508.010. A corporation’s
residence for venue purposes should therefore be either the location of its
192. Id. at 196.
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office or agent for the conduct of its usual and customary business or the
location of its agent for the service of process.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bifurcated decision rendered in the Armstrong and Taylor cases
evidences the court’s recognition of a need for change. Yet, it also evidences
an unwillingness to break from the precedent established by O’Keefe and its
progeny. When the court’s ship finally sinks under the rolling waves of
unnecessary complexity and illogical results, perhaps then will the court take
action in instilling a new statutory construction. This new statutory
construction needs to be simple and it needs to be consistent. And it can be
accomplished. All that is required is that the court recognizes that its prior
interpretation is too complex and illogical. Rather than having competing
venue statutes, which in turn results in litigious competition, there needs to be
harmony. Section 508.040 should locate a corporate defendant’s residence in
any county where that corporation maintains an office for the transaction of its
usual and customary business regardless of whether or not that corporation is
joined with other unincorporated defendants. Section 351.375 can still be used
to locate a corporation’s residence in the county of its registered agent for
purposes of section 508.010, but this should serve only as creating another
venue choice—not destroying all other choices granted under section 508.040.
As Judge Storckman stated in his dissent in Bowden: “I am convinced that
there is nothing radically wrong with [Missouri] venue statutes if they are
properly construed.”193 There is truth to this statement. For it is not the venue
statutes per se that are complex and illogical; it is the court’s interpretation of
them.
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